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The Supreme Judicial Court 
in its Fourth Century: 
Meeting the Challenge of the 
"New Constitutional Revolution" 
BY CHARLES H. BARON* 
Charles H. Baron is a Pro-
fessor of Law at Boston 
College Law School. 
(Photo by Ellen Shub. All 
rights reserved.) 
The Emergence of State Constitutional Law 
The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts 
enters its fourth century in the early years of what may 
be a new era of ascendancy of state supreme courts. 
Over the last 20 years, as the Supreme Court of the 
United States has reduced protections afforded indi-
vidual liberties under the United States Constitution, 
increasing attention has been directed toward state 
supreme courts and the protections afforded under 
state constitutions. In 1977, in a now-famous Harvard 
Law Review article, U.S. Supreme Court Justice 
William Brennan lauded this trend and wished it God-
speed. "[S]tate courts no less than federal are and 
ought to be the guardians of our liberties," he wrote. 
'The author is in the process of preparinll "The Massachusetts State 
Constitution: A Reference Guide," which is to be published by the 
Greenwood Press as part of its 52-volume set on American state 
constitutions. The author wishes to thank Juliana DeHaan and 
Kenneth Steinfield, second year students at Boston College Law 
School, for their research assistance in the preparation of this article. 
I. William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of 
Individual Rights, 90 HARv. L. REv. 489, 491 (1977). 
2. See Charles G. Douglas, III State Tudicial Activism: The New 
Role for State Bills of Rights, 12 SUFF. UNIV. L. REv. 1123 (1978). 
Justice Douglas criticizes Warren Court decisions not only as "bad 
policy for a federal system," but also as "intellectually invalid" for 
their failure to develop "'neutral principles' of law." ld. at 1137. 
"State constitutions, too, are a font 6f individual lib-
erties, their protections often extending beyond those 
required by the Supreme Court's interpretation of 
federal law. The legal revolution which has brought 
federal law to the fore must not be allowed to inhibit 
the independent protective force of state law-for 
without it, the full realization of our liberties cannot 
be guaranteed. II 1 A year later, another justice-this 
one less committed to continuing the agenda of the 
Warren Court-joined his voice to Justice Brennan's? 
In a 1978 Suffolk Law Review article, Supreme Court 
of New Hampshire Associate Justice Charles Douglas 
hailed "the pendulum swing II back to state 1\upreme 
courts. "State judges will be losing a golden opportu-
nity for states' rights," he warned, "if they do not seize 
the moment to dust off their state constitutions and to 
set in motion institutional and attitudinal changes in 
order to creatively protect the rights of their citizens 
from increasingly meddlesome and burgeoning 
bureaucracies and governmental agencies. 113 
In the years since these articles appeared, state 
supreme courts have increasingly followed the jus-
tices' advice. Where the Supreme Court of the United 
States had been unable to find in the Fourteenth 
Amendment any limit upon state relegation of public 
education to the inequities of support by local prop-
erty taxes,4 a growing number of state supreme courts 
have found such limits in their respective state 
constitutions.5 Where the United States Supreme 
Court has cut back on the criminal procedural protec-
3. ld. at 1123. 
4. San Antonio School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973). 
5. See Edgewood Indep. School Dist. v. Kirby (Edgewood I), 777 
S.W.2d 391 (Tex. 1989); Rose v. Council for Better Educ., 790 S.W.2d 
186 (Ky. 1989); Helena Elementary School Distr. v. State, 769 P.2d 
684 (Mont. 1989); Dupree v. Alma School Distr. No. 1 at 65 1 SW.2d 
90 (Ark. 1983); Washakie County School Dist. No.1 v. Herschler, 
606 P.2d31O (Wyo. 1980); Pauleyv. Kelley, S.E.2d 859 (W. Va. 1979); 
Seattle School Dist. No.1 v. State, 585 P.2d 71 (Wash. 1978) (en 
bane); Horton v. Meskill (Horton I), 376 A.2d 359 (Conn. 1977); 
Serrano v. Priest (Serrano II), 557 P.2d 929 (Cal. 1976); Robinson v. 
Cahill (Robinson I), 303 A.2d 273 (N.J. 1973). 
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tions to be found in the Bill of Rights and the Four-
teenth Amendment, many state supreme courts have 
found a basis in their state constitutions for retaining 
or increasing the protections previously afforded 
criminal defendants by the federal courts.6 And, in 
other areas where the Supreme Court has not defini-
tively spoken, state supreme courts have increasingly 
struck out on their own in the effort to protect indi-
vidual rights. For example, a number of state supreme 
courts have recognized a patient's "right to die"-
based on a right to privacy to be found in their state 
constitutions as well as in the Constitution of the 
United States.7 "In recent years, there have been strik-
ing developments in state constitutional law, " a lead-
ing scholar observed in 1991. "[Sjince the early 1970's 
we have been experiencing a 'constitutional revolu-
tion' in the judicial interpretation of individual rights 
provisions of state constitutions."s 
Perhaps the best evidence of the revolutionary 
magnitude and growing momentum of this move-
ment is the enormous amount of literature that it has 
begun to generate. Over the last two decades, books 
and law review articles on state constitutional law 
have proliferated. A recently-published selected bibli-
ography on the subject for the years 1980 to 1989 
comprises some 358 entries.9 Special symposium 
issues on state constitutional law have been published 
by numerous journals. lO An "Annual Issue on State 
6. See Note, Developments in the Law-The Interpretation of 
State Constitutional Rights, 95 HARV. L. REv. 1324, 1367-84 (1982). 
7. See, e.g., In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647 (N.J. 1976). 
8. Robert F. Williams, State Constitutional Law: Teaching and 
Scholarship, 41 J. LEGAL EDUC. 243, 244 (1991) (footnotes omitted). 
9. Earl M. Maltz, et aI., Selected Bibliography on State Constitu-
tional Law, 1980-1989,20 RUTGERS L. J. 1093 (1989). 
10. See, e.g., Annual Issue on New York State Constitutional Law, 
8 TOURO L. REv. 1 (1991); Louisiana Constitutional Law Sympo-
sium, 51 LA L. REv. 685 (1991); Symposium on the Texas Constitu-
tion, 68 TEx. L. REv. 1337 (1990); Symposium on Constitutional 
History: In Search of a Usable Past, 53 ALB. L. REv. 253 (1989); 
Symposium on State Constitutional Law, 64 WASH. L. REv. 1 (1989); 
A Symposium on State Constitutional Revision, 67 OR. L. REv. 1 
(1988); Symposium on State Constitutional Jurisprudence, 15 
HASTINGS CONST. L. Q. 391 (1988); Symposium: State Constitu-
tions in a Federal System, 496 ANNALS 10 (1988); The 1970 Illinois 
Constitution in Review: A Symposium on Issues for Change, 8 N . 
ILL. U.L. REv. 565 (1988); Symposium on the Arizona Constitution, 
20 ARIZ. ST. L.J. (1988); Symposium on the Revolution in State 
Constitutional Law, 13 VT. L. REv. 11 (1988); Symposium on State 
Constitutional History: New Developments in State Constitu-
tional Law, 17 PUBLIUS 1 (1987); The Georgia Constitution and the 
New Ascendancy of State Constitutional Law, 3 GA. ST. U.L. REv. 1 
(1986-87); Symposium on Constitutional Revision in Mississippi, 
56 MISS. L. J. 3 (1986); Symposium: The Emergence of State Consti-
tutional Law, 63 TEx. L. REv. 959 (1985); Symposium : The Wash-
ington Constitution, 8 U. PUGET SOUND L. REv. #2 (1985); Sympo-
sium: State Constitutional Law, 16 U. ToL. L. REv. 391 (1985); 
Symposium: The Rediscovery of the Connecticut Constitution, 15 
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Constitutional Law" has, since 1988, been published 
by the Rutgers Law Journa1. 11 One treatise on state 
constitutional law has recently been publishedl2 and 
at least one other is in process. 13 One case bookl4 and 
a "nutshell"ls have already been published, as have 
five volumes of what will eventually be a 52-volume 
set of "reference guides" to each of the state 
constitutions. 16 Since 1987, the National Association 
of Attorneys General has published a quarterly State 
Constitutional Law Bulletin, and, in 1988, it began 
publishing as well an annual law review, Emerging 
Issues in State Constitutional Law. The incredible 
growth of the literature in this field made Justice 
Brennan's 1977 article the eighth most cited law 
review article in the years 1979 to 1985.17 
Nonetheless, despite its intensity, this rising tide 
of state constitutionalism does not seem yet to have 
made its impact on the consciousness of the average 
citizen or even that of the average practicing lawyer. A 
poll conducted in 1988 by the Advisory Commission 
on Intergovernmental Relations found that 52 percent 
of persons interviewed said that they were unaware 
even that their states had their own constitutions. IS 
"Even among lawyers," the ACIR reported the next 
year: 
state constitutional law is relatively unknown and little 
practiced. Compared to the u.s. Constitution, state consti-
tutions are less frequently mentioned in the history and 
CONN. L. REv. 7 (1982); Symposium: New Federalism and New 
Constitutionalism, 56 CONN. BAR J. 183 (1982); Massachusetts 
Constitution Symposium, 14 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 841 (1980). 
11. Annual Issue on State Constitutional Law, 20 RUTGERS L. J. 
No. 4 (Summer 1989); Annual Issue on State Constitutional Law, 
21 RUTGERS L. J. No. 4 (Summer 1990). 
12. B. LATZER, STATE CONSTITUTIONS AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
(1991). 
13. D. SKOVER et aI., STATE CONSTITUTIONS AND INDIVIDUAL 
RIGHTS: CONSTITUTIONS, CASES &. COMMENTARY (Carolina Aca-
demic Press, forthcoming 1992- 93). 
14. ROBERT F. WILLIAMS, STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: CASES AND 
MATERIALS (1988). 
15. THOMAS C. MARKS, JR. AND JOHN F. COOPER, STATE CONSTITU-
TIONAL LAW IN A NUTSHELL (1988). 
16. Thus far published by the Greenwood Press are: R. WILLIAMS, 
THE NEW JERSEY STATE CONSTITUTION: A REFERENCE GUIDE (1990); 
L. LASKA, THE TENNESSEE STATE CONSTITUTION: A REFERENCE 
GUIDE (1990); P. GALlE, THE NEW YORK STATE CONSTITUTION: A 
REFERENCE GUIDE (1991); L. HARGRAVE, THE LOUISIANA STATE CON-
STITUTION: A REFERENCE GUIDE (1991); T. D 'ALEMBERT, THE FLOR-
IDA STATE CONSTITUTION: A REFERENCE GUIDE (1991). The 
52-volume set will include an introductory volume on state consti-
tutionallaw and a concluding volume of tables and indices, both 
prepared and written by the series editor, George Alan Tarr. 
17. Fred R. Shapiro, The Most-Cited Law Review Articles, 73 CAL. 
L. REv. 1540, 1554 (1985). 
18. Kincaid, State Court Protections of Individual Rights Under 
State Constitutions: The New Judicial Federalism , 61 J. STATE 
Gov'T. 163, 169 (1988). 
civics classes of public schools or the university, and regular 
reporting of state constitutional decisions, as well as the 
statistics of state court activities, has been, until very 
recently, quite rare. Even the law schools seldom offer 
courses in state constitutionallaw.19 
Preeminence of The Massachusetts Constitution 
Permitting study of u.s. constitutional law to 
eclipse study of state constitutional law in this fashion 
is particularly inappropriate in Massachusetts. The 
constitution of Massachusetts, as a source of funda-
mental principles of self-government, is at least the 
equal of the Constitution of the United States. Older 
than the u.s. Constitution by nine years-and per-
haps "the oldest written working constitution in the 
world"20-it served as a principal model for the u.s. 
Constitution. Written by John Adams in 1779, at a 
time when he had become "undoubtedly the greatest 
expert on constitutions in America, if not in the 
world,"21 it built upon Massachusetts' uniquely long 
and rich experience with written constitutions-
starting with the Mayflower Compact and The Char-
ter of the Massachusetts Bay Company-and 
engrafted the experience of sister states under the 
written constitutions with which they experimented 
during the early years of the revolution.22 
While much of what is best in the u.s. Constitu-
tion can be traced to the Massachusetts constitution, 
(Adams once claimed "I made a Constitution for Mas-
sachusetts, which finally made the Constitution of 
the United States. ,,23), the latter contains as well a rich 
lode of material not to be found in the former. 24 
Besides additional provisions which relate to state 
powers not delegated to the federal government, it 
contains provisions explicitly imposing duties on gov-
ernment in a fashion which has no analogue in the 
u.s. Constitution. As an example of the latter, con-
sider Chapter V, Section II of Part Two: 
Wisdom and knowledge, as well as virtue, diffused generally 
among the body of the people, being necessary for the pres-
ervation of their rights and liberties; and as these depend on 
spreading the opportunities and advantages of education in 
19. ADVISORY COMMISSION ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, 
STATE CONSTITUTIONS IN THE FEDERAL SYSTEM: SELECTED ISSUES 
AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR STATE INITIATIVES 2 (1989). 
20. Reardon, The Massachusetts Constitution Marks a Milestone, 
12 PUBLIUS 45 (1982). 
21. Samuel E. Morison, The Formation of the Massachusetts Con-
stitution, 40 MAss. 1. Q . 1 (No. 4, Dec. 1955). 
22. See, Robert F. Williams, "Experience Must Be Our Only 
Guide": The State Constitutional Experience of the Framers of the 
Federal Constitution, 15 HASTINGS CONST. 1. Q. 403 (1988). 
23. John Adams to Mercy Warren, July 28, 1807, quoted in RONALD 
M. PETERS, JR., THE MASSACHUSETTS CONSTITUTION OF 1780: A 
SOCIAL COMPACT 14 (1978). See Edward F. Hennessey, Massachu-
setts Roots of the Constitution of the United States, 72 MASS. L. 
REv. 3 (No. 3, Sept. 1987). 
the various parts of the country, and among the different 
orders of the people, it shall be the duty of Legislatures and 
the Magistrates, in all future periods of this Common-
wealth, to cherish the interests of literature and the sciences, 
and all seminaries of them; especially the university at 
Cambridge, public schools and grammar schools in the 
towns; to encourage private societies and public institu-
tions, rewards and immunities, for the promotion of agricul-
ture, arts, sciences, and commerce, trades, manufactures, 
and a natural history of the country; to countenance and 
inculcate the principles of humanity and general benevo-
lence, public and private charity, industry and frugality, 
honesty and punctuality in their dealings; sincerity, good 
humour, and all social affections, and generous sentiments 
among the people. 
Even where the two constitutions cover the same 
territory, the Massachusetts constitution frequently 
does so in a fashion which is more explicit, detailed 
and rich in resounding language. Where the u.s. Con-
stitution merely employs principles of separation of 
powers,25 Article XXX of the Massachusetts Declara-
tion of Rights attempts to guarantee them-and in 
forthright language which leaves no doubt as to the 
seriousness with which the guarantee was meant to be 
taken: 
In the government of this Commonwealth, the legislative 
department shall never exercise the executive and judicial 
powers, or either of them: The executive shall never exercise 
the legislative and judicial powers, or either of them: The 
judicial shall never exercise the legislative and executive 
powers, or either of them: to the end it may be a government 
of laws and not of men. 
And, where the u.s. Constitution merely attempts to 
assure independence of the judiciary by providing for 
life tenure and protected salaries,26 Article XXIX of the 
Declaration of Rights goes beyond that to expostulate: 
It is essential to the preservation of the rights of every 
individual, his life, liberty, property and character, that 
there be an impartial interpretation of the laws, and admin-
istration of justice. It is the right of every Citizen to be tried 
by judges as free, impartial and independent as the lot of 
humanity will admit. 
24. The Massachusetts Constitution lacks, however, some of the 
protections of the Bill of Rights. It does not, for example, contain an 
explicit provision protecting against double jeopardy. 
25. By, among other things, vesting in the Congress "[a]lllegislative 
powers herein granted" in Article I, Section I, vesting in the Presi-
dent "[t]he executive power" in Article II, Section 1, and vesting in 
the Supreme Court and the lower federal courts "[t]he judicial power 
of the United States" in Article III, Section 1. 
26. Article III, Section 1 provides in pertinent part: "The judges, 
both of the Supreme and inferior courts, shall hold their offices 
during good behavior, and shall, at stated times, receive for their 
services, a compensation, which shall not be diminished during 
their continuance in office." 
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The Massachusetts Constitution in the Courts 
The Massachusetts constitution has been, until 
recently, a sleeping giant. Over the last century, while 
the U.S. Supreme Court was slowly giving life to the 
Bill of Rights and gradually applying all but a few of its 
provisions to the states through the Fourteenth 
Amendment, it was easy to see the Massachusetts 
Declaration of Rights as an irrelevancy. What need 
was there to resort to the state constitution to protect 
individual liberties in the Commonwealth when the 
Supreme Court of the United States stood ready to do 
that job through its interpretation of the U.S. Consti-
tution? Moreover, as Justice Wilkins points out in his 
seminal article on the Declaration of Rights, written 
for the Massachusetts constitution's bicentennial in 
1980, there was little in the history of the Supreme 
Judicial Court's treatment of the Declaration of Rights 
to suggest that the court would have welcomed such 
claims. 
There is ... a strong tradition of judicial restraint on the 
court, and the Supreme Judicial Court has been most defer-
ential to legislative determinations. It appears that from 
1804 to 1916 only fifty-three acts were invalidated on con-
stitutional grounds. Between 1916 and 1936, only eleven 
acts were declared unconstitutional. Additionally, the 
Supreme Judicial Court did not join in the practice of over-
turning legislation on substantive due process grounds to as 
great a degree as did the Supreme Court of the United States 
in the period from about 1900 to about 1937?7 
However, attitudes are changing and the state con-
stitutional "sleeping giant" has begun to stir. In his 
1980 article, Justice Wilkins was already able to claim 
that "the Supreme Judicial Court currently appears 
more outspoken concerning the significance of rights 
under the Declaration of Rights than at any other time 
27. Herbert P. Wilkins, Judicial Treatment of the Massachusetts 
Declaration of Rights in Relation to Cognate Provisions of the 
United States Constitution, 14 SUFFOLK. U. 1. REv. 887, 890-91 
11980)lfootnotes omitted). For more recent treatments of the rising 
tide of state constitutional adjudication as it pertains to Massachu-
setts, see Henry Clay, Human Freedom and State Constitutional 
Law: Part One, The Renaissance, 70 MASS. 1. REv. 161 11985); 
Henry Clay, Human Freedom and State Constitutional Law: Part 
Two, The Process, 71 MASS. 1. REv. 1211986); Joseph D. Cronin, 
Incriminating Statements to the Police-State and Federal Norms, 
72 MASS. 1. REv. 611No. 3, Sept. 1987); Alexander Wohl, New Life 
for Old Liberties- The Massachusetts Declaration of Rights: A 
State Constitutional Law Case Study, 25 NEW ENG. 1. REv. 177 
11990). HERBERT P. WILKINS, et aI., Conference, THE MASSACHU-
SETIS V. THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION: DIFFERENCES IN THE 
PROTECTION OF INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS IMass. Bar Assoc. ed., Oct. 16, 
1991). Conference, THE STATE CONSTITUTION: A SLEEPING GIANT 
AWAKENS IMass Bar Assoc. ed., May 30, 1987). 
28. Wilkins, supra note 27, at 890. 
29. For example, language suggesting that Art. XVI of the Declara-
tion of Rights might provide protections for freedom of speech 
beyond those afforded by the Bill of Rights had appeared in Justice 
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in its history. ,,28 At the time, much of the court's 
"outspoken" behavior took the form of only dictum or 
language in concurring or dissenting opinions.29 But 
not all of it. In 1977, in Selectmen of Framingham v. 
Municipal Court of the City of Boston,3D Article XIV 
of the Declaration of Rights (which provides, in part, 
that "[e]very subject has a right to be secure from all 
unreasonable searches, and seizures, of his person, his 
houses, his papers, and all his possessions") had been 
used along with the Fourth Amendment to hold illegal 
a warrantless police search related to a disciplinary 
proceeding against a Framingham police officer. In 
1978, Article XVI of the Declaration of Rights, which, 
as amended,31 provides that " [t]he right of free speech 
shall not be abridged," had emerged in Common-
wealth v. Sees32 as a ground for protecting the right to 
freedom of expression of a nude dancer under circum-
stances where the U.S. Supreme Court would not have 
extended the protections of the First Amendment. In 
1979, Article XII and Article XV, which protect rights 
to jury trial, had been employed in Commonwealth v. 
Soares33 to strike down a prosecutor's discriminatory 
use of peremptory challenges-an action which had 
not yet been taken by the U .S. Supreme Court under 
the Fourteenth Amendment.34 And, in 1980, Article 
XXVI (prohibiting "cruel or unusual Punishments") 
was used in District Attorney v. Watson35 to invali-
date the Massachusetts death penalty by means of a 
standard which the Supreme Judicial Court acknowl-
edged to be stricter than that which might be 
employed by the U.S. Supreme Court under the Eighth 
Amendment.36 
Since 1980, this trend toward vitalizing the Massa-
chusetts Declaration of Rights has shown a steady and 
dramatic growth. In 1981, the Supreme Judicial Court 
Kaplan's concurring opinion in Commonwealth v. Horton, 365 
Mass. 164, 17311974) and his dissenting opinions in other cases-
two of them with other justices. See Revere v. Aucella, 369 Mass. 
138, 149-50 11975) IJustice Kaplan dissenting in part with whom 
Tauro, J. joins) and Commonwealth v. Trainor, 374 Mass. 796, 806 
11978)IJustice Kaplan dissenting, Liacos, J. joins). For other exam-
ples, see Wilkins, supra note 27, at 923-26. 
30. 373 Mass. 78311977). 
3l. The original Article XVI provided merely: liThe Liberty of the 
press is essential to the security of freedom in a state: it ought not, 
therefore, to be restrained in this Commonwealth. II The sentence 
quoted in the text was added by Amendment LXXVII in 1948. 
32. 374 Mass. 53211978). 
33. 377 Mass. 461 11979). 
34. Seven years later, in Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 7911986), the 
United States Supreme Court followed suit. 
35. 381 Mass. 64811980). 
36. In 1975, the Supreme Judicial Court had found the state's 
mandatory death penalty for rape-murder unconstitutional under 
the Declaration of Rights in Commonwealth v. O'Neal, 369 Mass. 
24211975). In 1977, the Supreme Judicial Court had rendered an 
built on the foundation laid in its "right to die" cases37 
to recognize a right to privacy in the Massachusetts 
constitution providing protections for abortion rights 
beyond those available from the U.S. Supreme Court. 
At issue in Moe v. Secretary of Administration and 
Finance38 was the constitutionality of provisions of 
the Massachusetts Medical Assistance Program that 
prohibited state funding for abortions if they were not 
necessary to prevent the death of the mother. In hold-
ing the provisions invalid under the due process 
requirements of the Massachusetts constitution (his-
torically traced to articles I, X, and XII of the Declara-
tion of Rights and Chapter I of The Frame of Govern-
ment), Justice Quirico noted that the U.S. Supreme 
Court had, in Harris v. McRae,39 "upheld enactments 
substantially identical to those challenged here 
against claims that they violated the due process and 
equal protection components of the Fifth and Four-
teenth Amendments to the United States Constitu-
tion. ,,40 "[Wlhen asked to interpret the Massachusetts 
Constitution," he said, "this court is 'not bound by 
Federal decisions, which in some respects are less 
restrictive than our Declaration of Rights.' ... We 
think our Declaration of Rights affords a greater 
degree of protection to the right asserted here than 
does the Federal Constitution as interpreted in Harris 
v. McRae. ,,41 
In two 1983 cases, the Supreme Judicial Court 
further broadened the protection afforded by the state 
constitutions by announcing that it would not impose 
upon the commonwealth's Declaration of Rights the 
same "state action" restrictions which the U.S. 
Supreme Court places upon the Bill of Rights and the 
Fourteenth Amendment. First, in Batchelder v. Allied 
Stores International,42 the court held that Article IX, 
advisory opinion to the House of Representatives which interpreted 
Article XXVI to forbid "the imposition of a death penalty in this 
Commonwealth in the absence of a showing on the part of the 
Commonwealth that the availability of that penalty contributes 
more to the achievement of a legitimate state purpose-for exam-
ple, the purpose of deterring criminal conduct - than the availabil-
ity in like cases of the penalty of life imprisonment. " Opinion of the 
Justices, 372 Mass. 912, 917 (19771. 
37. See, e.g., Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. 
Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 742 (1977); In Ie Spring, 380 Mass. 629, 
634 (19801, and Brophy v. New England Sinai Hospital, Inc., 398 
Mass. 417 (19861. 
38. 382 Mass. 629 (19811. 
39. 448 U.S. 297 (19801. 
40. Moe v. Secretary of Administration and Finance, 382 Mass. 629, 
650 (19811. 
41. ld. at 651. 
42. 388 Mass. 83 (19831. 
43. See Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507 (19761 reading Lloyd Corp. 
v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551 (19721 as having overruled Amalgamated 
Food Employees Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., 391 U.S. 308 
(19681· 
(which provides that "[alll elections ought to be free; 
and all the inhabitants of this Commonwealth, having 
such qualifications as they shall establish by their 
frame of government, have an equal right to elect 
officers, and to be elected, for public employments"), 
prevented Allied Stores from peremptorily banning 
from its North Shore Shopping Center all candidates 
who wished to solicit signatures for nominating peti-
tions. Because Allied Stores was not a state actor, its 
prohibition was immune from scrutiny under the 
Fourteenth Amendment-the U.S. Supreme Court 
had so held in a recent series of decisions.43 However, 
Justice Wilkins noted for the majority: 
[u]nlike the prohibition of the First Amendment to the 
Federal Constitution ( "Congress shall make no law ... ") and 
the limitation of the Fourteenth Amendment (" nor shall any 
State deprive any person ... "), art. 9 is not by its terms 
directed only against governmental action. There is, thus, 
no "State action" requirement expressed in art. 9, and we see 
no reason to imply such a requirement, and thereby to force 
a parallelism with the Federal Constitution.44 
Bolstering the court's position was the fact that courts 
in California,45 New Jersey,46 Pennsylvania47 and 
Washington48 had "regarded as meaningful the 
absence of State action language in their state 
constitutions. ,,49 "We also think," the court con-
cluded, "that the distinction is significant and reject 
any suggestion that the Declaration of Rights should 
be read as directed exclusively toward restraining gov-
ernment action. "so 
Later in 1983, in Phillips v. Youth Development 
Program, Inc.,51 the court, in another opinion by Jus-
tice Wilkins, expanded upon the state action theme 
raised in Batchelder. In that case, the plaintiff had 
invoked the due process provisions of the state consti-
44. Batchelder v. Allied Stores International, 388 Mass 83, 88 
(19831 · 
45. Robins v. Pruneyard Shopping Center, 592 P.2d 341 (Cal. 19791. 
46. State v. Schmid, 423 A.2d 615 (N.J. 19801. 
47. Commonwealth v. Tate, 432A.2d 1382 (Pa. 19811. For a limiting 
later interpretation of this case, see Western Pennsylvania Socialist 
Workers 1982 Campaign v. Connecticut General Life Ins. Co., 515 
A.2d 1331 (Pa. 19861. 
48. Alderwood Assocs. v. Washington Environmental Council, 635 
P.2d 108 (Wash. 19811. For a limiting later interpretation of this case, 
see Southcenter Joint Venture v. National Democratic Policy Com-
mittee, 780 P.2d 1282 (Wash. 19891. 
49. Batchelderv. Allied Stores International, 388 Mass. at 89 (19831. 
50. ld. Although the court's decision explicitly involves only Arti-
cle IX, the court suggests that, despite language to the contrary in 
Commonwealth v. Noffke, 376 Mass. 127 (19781, the court may feel 
no more bound by the United States Supreme Court's state action 
limitations when it applies the free speech protections of Article 
XVI or the freedom of assembly protections of Article XIX. Supra 
note 49, at 89 n .8. See also Phillips v. Youth Dev. Program, Inc., 390 
Mass. 652, 659 n.6 (19831. 
51. 390 Mass. 652 (19831. 
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tution to claim that her discharge from employment 
by the defendant was invalid. The court noted that due 
process protections (unlike those of Article IX) were 
"inherently concerned with governmental action" 
and, therefore, could be applied only against defen-
dants who are state actors. Nonetheless, the court 
went on to say: 
[t]here is little doubt that this court may fashion its own 
concepts of due process of law under the Constitution of the 
Commonwealth and apply them within the permissible 
limits of the Constitution of the United States, [and, there-
fore,] in determining what is State action for State due 
process of law purposes, we need not define State action as 
the Supreme Court of the United States has defined State 
action for Fourteenth Amendment and [federal civil rights 
litigation] purposes. 52 
In 1984, the Supreme Judicial Court was once 
again faced with a death penalty statute and once 
again found such a statute unconstitutional. This time 
the court's decision could not be bottomed, as it had in 
Watson, solely upon Article XXVI's prohibition of 
"cruel or unusual punishments." In 1982, the voters 
of the Commonwealth had effectively overruled Wat-
son by adding to Article XXVI the following language: 
No provision of the Constitution, however, shall be con-
strued as prohibiting the imposition of the punishment of 
death. The general court may, for the purpose of protecting 
the general welfare of the citizens, authorize the imposition 
of the 'punishment of death by the courts of law having 
jurisdiction of crimes subject to the punishment of death. 
But the death penalty statute enacted shortly thereaf-
ter carried other constitutional defects. In Common-
wealth v. Colon-Cruz,53 the Supreme Judicial Court 
found that the new law violated Article XII's jury trial 
and self-incrimination protections because it rendered 
defendants vulnerable to the death penalty only if they ., 
pleaded not guilty and demanded a jury trial. "The 
inevitable consequence," said Justice Wilkins for the 
court, "is that defendants are discouraged from assert-
ing their right not to plead guilty and their right to 
demand a trial by jury.,,54 To the prosecutor's claim 
that the new amendment insulated the death penalty 
from such review under constitutional provisions 
other than Article XXVI Justice Wilkins replied: 
52. ld. at 658. 
53. 393 Mass. 150 (1984). 
54. ld. at 163. 
55. ld. at 161-62. 
56. 394 Mass. 363 (1985). 
57. 462 U.S. 213 (1983). 
58. 378 U.S. 108 (1964). 
59. 393 U.S. 410 (1969). 
60. "Under the Aguilar-Spinelli standard, if an affidavit is based on 
information from an unknown informant, the magistrate must 'be 
informed of (1) some of the underlying circumstances from which 
40 / Massachusetts Law Review / March 1992 
The construction of [the amendment] which the Common-
wealth urges us to adopt would mean that a statute estab-
lishing the death penalty for members of one particular race 
only or providing for the imposition of the death penalty 
without trial would be valid under the Massachusetts Con-
stitution. In the absence of any indication to the contrary in 
the language and history of the amendment, we cannot 
accept the Commonwealth's radical construction of [it] as 
carrying into effect the reasonable purpose of the people. 55 
In 1985, the court began an important series of 
decisions employing Article XIV of the Declaration of 
Rights, rather than the Fourth Amendment, to protect 
citizen privacy from incursions by the state's F,olice 
processes. First, in Commonwealth v. Upton, 6 the 
Supreme Judicial Court held Article XIV's probable 
cause requirements for issuance of a search warrant to 
be stricter than those of the Fourth Amendment. The 
U.S. Supreme Court's decision two years before, in 
Illinois v. Gates,57 had abandoned the probable cause 
requirements laid down by the Court in Aguilar v. 
Texas58 and Spinelli v. United States.59 In place of 
Aguilar and Spinelli's specific two-pronged standard 
for testing the reliability of an informant's state-
ment,60 the Court had adopted a new, more evanes-
cent "totality of the circumstances" standard. In 
Upton, the Supreme Judicial Court rejected the Gates 
test as "'unacceptably shapeless and permissive' [and 
lacking] the precision that we believe can and should 
be articulated in stating a test for determining proba-
ble cause.,,61 Noting that Gates had been much criti-
cized by scholars and other state supreme courts,62 the 
court announced that Massachusetts would retain the 
Aguilar -Spinelli test as the standard for probable cause 
under Article XIV of the Declaration of Rights. "The 
test we adopt has been followed successfully by the 
police in this Commonwealth for approximately 
twenty years," Justice Wilkins wrote for the court. "It 
is a test that aids lay people, such as the police and 
certain magistrates, in a way that the 'totality of the 
circumstances' test never could. We believe it has 
encouraged and will continue to encourage more care-
ful police work and thus will tend to reduce the num-
ber of unreasonable searches conducted in violation of 
art. 14.,,63 
Three days later, in Commonwealth v. Ford,64 the 
court went beyond Upton to decide, for the first time, 
the informant concluded that the contraband was where he claimed 
it was (the basis of knowledge test), and (2) some of the underlying 
circumstances from which the affiant concluded that the informant 
was II credible II or his informant II reliable II (the veracity test) . [Citing 
to Aguilar.] If the informant's tip does not satisfy each aspect of the 
Aguilar test, other allegations in the affidavit that corroborate the 
information could support a finding of probable cause. [Citing to 
Spinelli.]'" Commonwealth v. Upton, 394 Mass. 363, 374-75 (1985). 
61. 394 Mass. 363, 373 (1985). 
62. ld. at 374, n .lO. 
63 . ld. at 376. 
64. 394 Mass. 421 (1985) . 
that Article XIV imposed an exclusionary rule on the 
courts of the commonwealth. Upton had not decided 
this issue because, in that case, a state statute had 
been read to require exclusion of the illegally obtained 
evidence.65 The issue had not been determined in the 
1977 Framingham decision66 because, although the 
evidence in that case had been excluded" as a matter of 
Massachusetts law, ,,67 the court had not made clear 
whether the principle employed was one of common 
law, court rule or constitutional mandate.68 But the 
facts of Ford were seen to involve circumstances in 
which Article XIV required exclusion of the evidence. 
"We are thus holding," said Justice Wilkins, again 
writing for the majority, "that art. 14 of the Declara-
tion of Rights requires the exclusion of evidence 
seized during a storage search not conducted pursuant 
to standard police procedures. ,,69 
Since 1985, Article XIV has been used as a basis for 
finding evidence excludable in four other important 
criminal cases. In Commonwealth v. Blood,70 the 
Supreme Judicial Court, in an opinion by Justice Lia-
cos, held that, despite U.S. Supreme Court decisions 
interpreting the Fourth Amendment differently, 71 
"one party consent" by a police informant carrying a 
radio transmitter into a conversation with suspects 
could not, under Article XlV, eliminate the need to 
obtain a warrant upon probable cause before engaging 
in such rR0lice eavesdropping. In Commonwealth v. 
Panetti, the court, per Justice Wilkins, determined 
that warrantless eavesdropping by a policeman lodged 
in a crawlspace under a defendant's apartment vio-
lated Article XIv, "[w]hatever the Supreme Court of 
the United States might decide under the Fourth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution.,,73 In 
Horsemen's Benevolent and Protective Association v. 
State Racing Commission,74 the court, in an opinion 
by Chief Justice Hennessey, found in favor of plaintiffs 
who challenged the commission's sweeping program 
for testing its licensees for drug use, saying: "[W]e 
need not consider this case in the context of the 
Fourth Amendment, because we now conclude that 
the drug testing program, in both the testing at ran-
dom and on 'reasonable suspicion,' is unconstitu-
tional under art. 14 of the Massachusetts Declaration 
65. G.L M. c.276, §2B. 
66. Supra, note 30. 
67. Supra, note 30 at 787-88. 
68. For a discussion of the Supreme Judicial Court's use of judicial 
rule-making and common law development to provide procedural 
protections without reaching constitutional issues, see Wilkins, 
supra note 27, at 888-89. 
69. Supra, note 64, at 426. 
70. 400 Mass. 61 (1987) 
71. See United States v. Caceres, 440 U.S. 741 (1979). 
72. 406 Mass. 230 (1989). 
73 . ld. at 234. 
74. 403 Mass. 692 (1989). 
of Rights.,,75 And in Guiney v. Police Commissioner 
of Boston, 76 the court invalidated a similar drug test-
ing program - this one imposed by departmental rule 
on all Boston police officers. The program had been 
held constitutional under the Fourth Amendment by 
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit,?7 but 
the Supreme Judicial Court found that it did not meet 
the more demanding scrutiny of Article XIV. "Consti-
tutional safeguards should not be abandoned simply 
because there is a drug problem in this country," 
Justice Wilkins noted for the court. "Article 14 of the 
Declaration of Rights should not be a casualty in the 
war on drugs. It is at times when pressures on consti-
tutional rights are greatest that courts must be espe-
cially vigilant in the protection of those rights.,,78 
In 1990, yet another provision of the Declaration of 
Rights-Article II, guaranteeing each citizen freedom 
for "worshipping GOD in the manner and season 
most agreeable to the Dictates of his conscience 
... provided he doth not Disturb the public peace, or 
obstruct others in their religious Worship" - was 
given new life by the Supreme Judicial Court. In Soci-
ety of Jesus 0ls New England v. Boston Landmarks 
Commission, 9 a unanimous court, in an opinion by 
Justice Lynch, held that government efforts to closely 
regulate renovations to the interior of a Catholic 
church on the ground that the church had been desig-
nated an historic landmark violated constitutional 
limits imposed by Article II. In 1980, Justice Wilkins 
had noted in his bicentennial law review article that 
"[t]he pervasive impact of the Supreme Court's treat-
ment of the freedom of religion under the first amend-
ment seemingly has made unnecessary any consider-
ation of article 2 in recent decades. ,,80 In 1989, the year 
before Society of Jesus, the court had held, in Com-
monwealth v. Nissenbaum,81 that religiously-
motivated use of marijuana was not constitutionally-
protected-largely on the basis of federal decisions 
which interpreted the First Amendment in a fashion 
which the court found "instructive" as to how it 
should interpret Article 11.82 But in Society of Jesus, 
the court made no reference to the First Amendment 
or federal decisions, preferring to rely entirely upon its 
independent reading of the Declaration of Rights. Pre-
75. ld. at 694. 
76. 411 Mass. 328 (1991). 
77. Guiney v. Roache, 873 F.2d 1557 (1st Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 
493 U.S. 963 (1989). 
78. Guiney v. Police Commissioner of Boston, 411 Mass. 328, 
333-32. 
79. 409 Mass. 38 (1990). For a recent comment on this case, see 
Donald R. Frederico, Constitutional Law-Free Exercise of Reli-
gion, 76 MASS. 1. REv. 161 (1991). 
80. Wilkins, supra note 27, at 897. 
81. 404 Mass. 575 (1989). 
82. ld. at 579-81. 
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sumably this was because the U.S. Supreme Court 
had, just eight months before, handed down its deci-
sion in Employment Division v. Smith83 foreboding a 
severe cutting back of First Amendment "free exer-
cise" protections by that court. 
Conclusion 
By now the trend is clear. As the U.S. Supreme 
Court has turned its face from established protections 
under the federal Bill of Rights, the Supreme Judicial 
Court has increasingly looked to the protections of the 
Massachusetts Declaration of Rights. This is a trend, 
as we noted earlier, which finds support in decisions of 
supreme courts in an increasing number of other 
states. It is a trend which finds support also in earlier 
decisions of the Supreme Judicial Court. As Justice 
Wilkins pointed out in his 1980 article, the Supreme 
Judicial Court of a half century ago refused to follow 
the U.S. Supreme Court in abandoning constitutional 
protections for economic rights in much the same way 
that today's court refuses to follow the federal lead in 
abandoning protections for individual rights : 
When the high-water mark of substantive due process under 
the federal Constitution was reached in 1937 and the tide 
ebbed with such force that the Supreme Court might be said 
to have substantially abandoned any due process protections 
in the field of economic regulation, some indications of 
separate state constitutional protections in the field of eco-
nomic regulation appeared. These were outcroppings no 
longer submerged by the reach of the fourteenth 
amendment.84 
Then as now, changes in the personnel of the U.S. 
Supreme Court had caused federal courts to radically 
alter protections afforded against governmental abuse. 
Then as now, the Supreme Judicial Court refused to 
automatically follow suit. 
Obviously, the Supreme Judicial Court and many 
other state supreme courts have their own indepen-
dent views of the extent to which government is to be 
checked by constitutions and the judges who enforce 
them. That these views seem very much influenced 
by U.S. Supreme Court doctrine from the "high water 
mark" era of protection of individual rights should 
come as no surprise. To the extent that the federal 
doctrine of the period was incorporated into the Four-
teenth Amendment, state judges became experienced 
83. 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
84. Wilkins, supra note 27, at 911. 
85. U.S. Const., Art. VI, cl. 2. 
86. Jerome B. Falk, Jr., The Supreme Court of California 1971 -1972. 
Foreword, The State Constitution: A More Than ''Adequate'' Non-
federal Ground, 61 CAL. 1. REv. 273, 285 (1973). 
87. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Bran-
deiS, J., dissenting). 
88. Amendment CVI (1976) and Amendment CXIV (1980). 
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in employing it because they were required to do so by 
the Supremacy Clause.8s The U.S. Supreme Court no 
longer requires state judges to employ all of that doc-
trine. But many of them find that their experience in 
applying it has led them to an independent bdief in its 
validity. And they have found in their state constitu-
tions independent bases upon which to ground it. 
With the rediscovery of state constitutions, the 
process of development of constitutional law becomes 
enormously enriched. State supreme courts are offered 
the opportunity to participate in the discussion and 
development of doctrine as full partners. "For a state 
court interpreting a state constitution," one scholar 
has observed, "opinions of the United States Supreme 
Court are like opinions of sister state courts. While 
neither binding in a constitutional sense nor prece-
dential in a jurisprudential one, they are entitled to 
whatever weight their reasoning and intellectual per-
suasiveness warrant.,,86 Where the nation has had 
essentially one crucible for trying the principles of 
judicial review it now has many. And new meaning is 
given to Justice Brandeis' well-known paean to Amer-
ican federalism: 
It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a 
single courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve a as 
a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments 
without risk to the rest of the country.87 
Massachusetts is well equipped to play the role of 
one such "courageous State." It has a distinguished 
and venerable constitution rich in protections for civil 
rights and civil liberties. In 1976 and 1980, the Decla-
ration of Rights' equal protection provisions were bol-
stered by amendments which forbid discrimination 
on the basis of sex, race, color, creed, national origin or 
handicap.88 But even as it was in 1783, Article I's 
declaration that "All men are born free and equal" 
provided a sufficient basis for the Supreme Judicial 
Court to declare slavery unlawful. 89 Massachusetts 
also has a distinguished and learned bar steeped in a 
tradition of public service. Members of the bar have 
increasingly invoked the protections of the state con-
stitution on behalf of their clients since the 1979 
Massachusetts Civil Rights Act90 and the Supreme 
Judicial Court's recognition of state-based exclusion-
ary rules91 have made opportunities for so doing more 
readily available. 
89. Commonwealth v. Jennison, Proceedings of the Massachusetts 
Historical Society 292-99 (1875). See also John D. Cushing, The 
Cushing Court and Abolition of Slavery in Massachusetts: More 
Notes on the "Quock Walker Case," 5 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 118 
(1961). 
90. G.L.M. c.12, §§l1H-llJ. For an excellent discussion of Massa-
chusetts civil rights in general see Marjorie Heins, Massachusetts 
Civil Rights Law, 76 MASS. 1. REv. 26 (1991) and 76 Mass 1. Rev. 77 
(1991). 
91. See supra text accompanying notes 63-68. 
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, Massachu-
setts has the Supreme Judicial Court. In the mid-19th 
century, when the United States was confronted with 
daunting changes wrought by its expanding frontiers 
and the advent of the industrial revolution, its state 
supreme courts developed the principles of law which 
facilitated the nation's growth into the great continen-
tal power it became. First in influence among these 
state supreme courts was the Supreme Judicial Court 
of Massachusetts-whose chief justice, Lemuel 
Shaw, came widely to be known as "America's great-
est magistrate." It is this tradition that the court 
brings with it as it develo~s its place in the "new 
constitutional revolution,,9 presently sweeping our 
state supreme courts. It is a tradition fraught with 
potential for great service to the commonwealth and 
to the nation as the Supreme Judicial Court enters its 
fourth century. 
92. Professor Robert F. Williams has used this term to describe the 
rising constitutional prominence of state supreme courts. See Rob-
ert F. Williams, State Constitutional Law Processes, 24 WM. & 
MARY L. REv. 169, 171 (1983). In so doing, he means, among other 
things, to contrast it with the "constitutional revolution" wrought 
by the U.s . Supreme Court in the late 1930s. Id. at n.!. 
Lemuel Shaw. (Image courtesy of the Social Law 
Library.) 
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